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DUTY IN TORT LAW: AN ECONOMIC

APPROACH
Keith N. Hylton*
INTRODUCTION

Torts textbooks say that a negligence claim consists of four components:
duty, breach, causation, and damages. The plaintiff must show, or at least
the court must be prepared to assume, that the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty to take care. If the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the
plaintiff will be permitted to prove that the defendant breached the duty of
care. The third component consists of the plaintiffs proof that the
defendant's breach caused his injury, and the final component is the
plaintiff s proof that he suffered a compensable injury.
Theories of tort law have focused on the breach and causation
components of negligence, saying little if anything about duty. 1 Indeed, the
two most comprehensive consequentialist efforts to explain tort law-the
utilitarian analysis of Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 and the economic analysis of
Richard Posner 3-have focused almost entirely4 on breach and causation
issues while virtually ignoring the duty question.
My goal in this paper is to fill the space left largely untouched by Holmes
and Posner by providing an economic framework that explains duty
doctrine. I hope to make clear that duty doctrine is in no sense inconsistent

* Professor of Law, Boston University, khylton@bu.edu. This paper was presented at the
Fordham Law School Symposium The Internal Point of View in Law andEthics. For helpful

comments I thank Youngjae Lee, Benjamin Zipursky, Katrina Wyman, and other conference
participants.
1. For criticism of the lack of attention to duty doctrine in modem torts scholarship, see
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1733 (1998); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 657 (2001) [hereinafter Goldberg &
Zipursky, Duty in Negligence Law].

2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881).
3. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(1987).

4. To be fair, Posner did examine the duty issue in a narrow setting in his article on
rescue. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978).

The Landes-Posner analysis of rescue anticipates, in some respects, the argument of this
paper. However, the Landes-Posner article on rescue does not claim to set out a general
theory of duty doctrine, which is the aim of this essay.
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with economic rationales of tort law. 5 Moreover, providing a positive
economic theory of duty doctrine leads to a more comprehensive synthesis
of the economic literature on torts; specifically by showing the connection
within the context of negligence doctrine between property6 rules, which
enjoin conduct, and liability rules, which merely tax conduct.
The theory that best explains duty doctrines in tort law is the same as the
theory that explains strict liability doctrine. The core function of both sets
of doctrines is to regulate the frequency or scale of activities that have
substantial external effects. Strict liability aims to suppress or tax activities
that carry unusually large external costs. Duty doctrines, especially those
relieving actors of a duty of care, serve several functions, but one important
class encourages or subsidizes activities that carry substantial external
benefits. Another class of duty-relieving doctrines serves as a complement
to property rules. And still another class of duty-relieving doctrines serves
to permit markets to function without distortions created by liability.
While the traditional economic approach to tort law focuses on care or
instantaneous precaution decisions, this essay focuses on activity
decisions-how much to engage in activities that impose uncompensated
costs or benefits on others. In this analysis four types of rules can be
identified in terms of their activity effects: property rules, which prohibit
activity; strict liability rules, which tax activity without prohibiting;
negligence rules, which do not affect activity levels; and no-duty rules,
which subsidize activity. I use the framework developed here to explain
doctrines such as the rescue rule (the absence of a general duty to rescue),
the duties of landowners, and other pockets of law in which courts have
consistently relieved some actor of a duty to take care.
I. A SKELETAL THEORY
A. The TraditionalApproach and Its Shortcomings
The traditional economic analysis of tort law takes the famous balancing
test of the Learned Hand formula as the default rule for questions of
liability. 7 Under the Hand balancing test, one should compare the benefits

5. There is a more general critique of consequentialist, or sanction-centered, theories of
law that asserts that they are inadequate because they ignore the internal sense of obligation
that is perceived by actors in advanced legal systems. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
(2d ed. 1994). The lack of attention to duty doctrine reflected in the consequentialist
approach could be viewed as an important fact supporting this internal-viewpoint critique.

Looking from this perspective, this essay's message is that consequentialist theories are quite
capable of explaining duty doctrine.

6. In particular, duty doctrine provides a link, in the context of negligence law, between
the property and liability rules initially identified in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85
Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). For discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
7. The Learned Hand formula was articulated by Judge Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). For extensive treatments of the traditional
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of taking additional care, in terms of expected injury costs avoided, to the
burden of taking additional care. It is sometimes described as the BPL test,
where B represents the burden, P the probability of an injury, and L the
dollar amount of the injury. Under the Hand balancing test, a court should
hold a defendant liable when he failed to care in a setting in which the
burden of additional care is less than the expected injury costs that could
have been avoided (B < PL).
One does not need to have an interest in economics to see the
applicability of economic reasoning to the Hand formula. The economic
efficiency rationale for the Hand formula is easy to state. 8 If the cost of
taking care is less than the expected injury costs that could be avoided by
taking care, the actor should be encouraged to take care in order to reduce
overall social costs. In other words, social welfare is higher when the actor
takes care than when he does not take care. However, if the cost of taking
care is greater than the expected injury costs of not taking care, it would be
economically inefficient to take care.
Guido Calabresi, Richard Posner, and Steven Shavell have modified this
approach by recognizing the importance of distinguishing care level and
activity level concerns. 9 One can reduce the likelihood of an accident by
taking care, or by not acting at all. For example, one can reduce the
likelihood of a traffic injury occurring by driving with greater care, or by
not driving at all. The decision not to drive, or to drive less frequently, is an
activity level decision, while the decision to drive more slowly is a care
level decision.
Distinguishing activity level and care level effects permits one to make
an economic case for choosing strict liability over negligence. Since actors
will take care under both the negligence and strict liability rules, strict
liability is preferable to negligence only if it is desirable to reduce the
activity level. It might be desirable to reduce the activity level if, for
0
example, taking extra care will do little to reduce the frequency of injury.1
To sum up, the traditional economic approach to tort law treats the Hand
balancing test as the default rule, and strict liability as an option that should
be adopted when it is desirable to reduce activity levels. The traditional

economic approach see Landes & Posner. supra note 3, and Steven Shavell, Economic
Analysis of Accident Law (1987).
8. Of course, this should not be taken to mean that it is obvious. Indeed, the economic
efficiency rationale was first articulated only thirty years ago. See Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
9. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis
(1970); Posner, supra note 8; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (1980). For a critique of the Posner-Shavell approach as a theory of the case law, see
Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. Legal
Stud. 319 (1992).
10. This view of the purpose of strict liability was stressed by Judge Posner in Indiana
HarborBelt Railroadv. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
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approach has been applied largely, to negligence law, and has been
successful in explaining negligence doctrine. "I
Surprisingly, in view of its success in explaining negligence doctrine, the
traditional economic approach has so far not had as much success in
providing positive theories of two broad areas of tort doctrine: duty and
strict liability. 12 The traditional economic approach, largely due to Posner,
has hardly mentioned duty doctrine, save for the special case of rescue.13 In
this sense, the traditional economic model has followed the course set by
the utilitarian analysis of Holmes, which also failed to find a role for duty
doctrine in tort law. 14
The same can be said of strict liability. The argument that strict liability
should be chosen over negligence when it is desirable to reduce activity
levels begs the question rather than providing a theory of strict liability.
Why should we prefer to reduce activity levels? The traditional approach,
reflected in the work of Posner and Shavell and put most clearly in
application in Judge Posner's Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co. decision, seems to answer that question by saying
that we should adopt strict liability when due care is insufficient to
eliminate accidents. 15 But due care is never sufficient to eliminate
accidents, so this theory suggests that strict liability should be adopted
across the board in place of the negligence rule in tort law. 16 Moreover,
there are some instances, such as at zoos, in which substantial risk remains
after the defendant has exercised due care, and yet courts choose not to
adopt strict liability.
It happens that the concurrent shortcomings of the traditional economic
approach to tort law in providing positive theories of duty doctrine and of
strict liability doctrine are not coincidental. In other words, this is not a
case in which the traditional approach misses two distinct targets for totally
independent reasons. The theoretical bases for duty doctrine and strict
11. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 3.
12. Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
54 Vand. L. Rev. 1413 (2001).
13. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 4.

14. In particular, Holmes apparently did not see a need to relieve actors of a duty of care.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. Rev. 652, 660 (1873)
(endorsing a general duty of "all the world to all the world"); see also Goldberg & Zipursky,
Duty in Negligence Law, supra note 1, at 692-98.
15. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 916 F.2d at 1176-77. See also, Landes & Posner, supra
note 3, at 107-18, which applies the traditional argument to several cases. It is true that in a
case such as blasting, a great risk of harm continues to be imposed on others even when
reasonable care is being taken. For that reason, the claim that strict liability is appropriate
when due care is insufficient seems justifiable. However, there is a residual risk of harm
imposed on others in all circumstances of risk-creating conduct-such as driving a car. The
theory presented by Landes, Posner, and Shavell implies that strict liability should apply to

all such conduct (including automobile use). And the theory runs into difficulty in
explaining the negligence rule applied to zoos. See id. at 108. Why should the negligence
rule apply in the case of a zoo and strict liability in the case of a private owner of a wild
animal?
16. Hylton, supra note 12.
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liability doctrine, I will argue, are essentially the same. The traditional
approach fails to hit the bull's-eye of both of these targets because they are
not distinct targets. A theory that explains duty doctrine will also explain
strict liability doctrine, and the converse is true as well.
B. Missing Markets Framework: Explainingthe Functions of Duty and
Strict Liability Rules
An alternative approach that I labeled the "missing markets" model offers
a positive theory of strict liability doctrine. 17 In this part I will argue that
the missing markets framework also explains duty doctrine. Indeed, the
two doctrines are so closely related that any theory that explains one will
necessarily explain the other.
The missing markets framework focuses on activity levels and assumes
that externalities are prevalent. Strict liability is preferable to negligence if
the costs externalized by an activity substantially outweigh the benefits
externalized. 18 Negligence is preferable if there is a rough equality between
externalized benefits and externalized costs. A rule stating that the actor
has no duty, I will argue here, is preferable to the negligence rule when the
benefits externalized are considerably in excess of the externalized costs.
Let us consider an illustration of the missing markets model. Suppose we
are considering some activity (e.g., the amount of automobile use or the
amount of rail service). The incremental or marginal private benefits of the
activity are the benefits that accrue to the acting party, the person deciding
the scale at which he will engage in the activity. The marginal private
benefits can be represented by a downward-sloping schedule, somewhat
like the standard demand schedule of supply-demand analysis. This is the
curve labeled MPB, for marginal private benefit, in Figure 1. The
horizontal axis measures the scale of the activity. The downward-sloping
MPB schedule reflects the assumption of diminishing marginal utility as the
activity increases. Consider, for example, driving as an activity. The
incremental private benefits of driving are high initially, as one makes use
of a car for the most important tasks-going to work, or obtaining
necessities. As the use of the car increases, the gain from an additional mile
of driving declines, because the driver uses the car for less pressing needse.g., to save time traveling some distance that could easily be walked.
The marginal cost of the activity can be represented by an upward
sloping schedule, as shown in Figure 1, and labeled MPC, for marginal
private cost. The marginal private cost schedule reflects costs borne by the
actor who is determining the scale at which to engage in the activity. The
upward slope shown in the figure assumes the incremental cost increases as
the actor increases the scale of the activity. For example, as the driver

17. Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 977
(1996).
18. Id. at 984-93.
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increases the frequency of use of his car, the costs incurred from
depreciation and exposure to accidents increase.
Since externalities are assumed to be prevalent, Figure 1 includes
alternative schedules that reflect external costs and external benefits. If
there are external benefits, the social benefit from the actor's activity is
simply the sum of the private and external benefits. This is shown by the
curves labeled MSB (low externality) and MSB (high externality). For
example, suppose that a driver uses his car to get to work. Suppose in
addition a coworker occasionally asks the driver for a ride to some place on
the driver's usual path. The fact that the driver uses his car to go to work
provides an external benefit to the coworker. 19 That external benefit is
reflected in the vertical distance between the marginal private benefit
schedule and the marginal social benefit schedule.
Figure 1
S per""
Activity
Unit

SMAIS("

('¢rl

high externali(iv

(haZterniin

The private benefit and private cost schedules allow us to find the scale
of the activity chosen by the actor under a negligence rule-that is, the
privately optimal scale of activity. The negligence rule does not force the
actor to bear the external costs of his activity when the actor is exercising
due care. Thus, when the actor is exercising due care, which is assumed to
be the case, the scale of the activity will be given by the activity level
associated with point A in Figure 1. This is the privately optimal scale
because it reflects costs and benefits borne by the actor.
19. Of course, the driver may benefit directly from offering rides to coworkers, through
reciprocal favors. However, he is unlikely, as a general matter, to value the benefits of
offering rides to coworkers as much as the coworkers value those benefits themselves.
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The social benefit and social cost schedules allow us to find the socially
optimal scale of the activity. The reason is that an activity should be carried
on a greater scale as long as the incremental societal benefit exceeds the
incremental societal cost. As long as this is true, an increase in the scale
adds to society's wealth. When the marginal social benefit is just equal to
the marginal social cost, the activity's scale should not be increased further,
since to do so would push it to the point where the incremental social
benefit is less than the incremental social cost. Thus, the optimal scale is
represented by the intersection between the marginal social cost and
marginal social benefit.
If externalized costs and externalized benefits are roughly equal, then the
socially optimal scale of the activity will be the same as the privately
optimal scale of the activity. This is shown by point B. At point B, the
marginal social cost, which is the sum of the marginal private cost and the
marginal external cost, is equal to the marginal social benefit, which is the
sum of the marginal private benefit and the marginal external benefit.
Alternatively, if the costs externalized by the actor are20roughly equal to the
costs externalized by the victim, the same result holds.
Suppose external benefits are relatively modest and external costs are
large in comparison. When external costs are considerably larger than
external benefits, the socially optimal scale of the activity will be given by
point C. If, on the other hand, external benefits are far in excess of external
costs, the optimal scale will be point G.
Now we come to the law. When the externalized benefits and
externalized costs associated with the actor's activity (or the costs
externalized by both injurer and victim) are roughly the same, as at point B,
the negligence rule is optimal. The reason is that the negligence rule
imposes no liability on the actor when he exercises reasonable care, as
assumed. Since the negligence rule imposes no liability on the actor when
he exercises reasonable care, and since it is assumed that he will exercise
reasonable care, liability will not distort his activity level choice away from
21
the socially optimal scale (the scale associated with points A and B).
An equally important point is that when the externalized costs and
externalized benefits connected to the actor's activity are the same, or when
there is a reciprocal exchange of externalized costs, the actor should owe a
duty of care to the potential victim. Of course, if the actor's externalized

20. Consider the following unitization rationale. Imagine two firms imposing reciprocal
costs of one dollar per month on each other. If the firms merged, would they require a
transfer of one dollar, both ways, between the merged units? No, because it would have no
effect on the incentives of relevant actors. By the same reasoning, when two actors impose
the same costs, imposing strict liability on both would not alter their activity levels from the
levels chosen under the negligence rule.

21. In the case of reciprocal harms, the unitization argument made in note 20 suggests
that the activity levels chosen under strict liability will be the same as those chosen under
negligence. This implies that there is no need to adopt strict liability in place of negligence
in the reciprocal harms setting.
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costs are greater than his externalized benefits, the duty of care is still
socially desirable.
A strict liability rule would force the actor to pay for the external costs
generated by his activity, whether or not he had taken care. As a result, the
actor would exercise reasonable care, just as he would under the negligence
rule. However, in addition to inducing care, strict liability affects the
actor's activity scale decision. Under strict liability, the actor's cost
schedule becomes the marginal social cost schedule, which represents the
sum of private and external costs. If external costs are large relative to
external benefits, the actor's privately optimal scale will be point E. This is
not necessarily the same as the socially optimal scale. If there are relatively
modest external benefits, the socially optimal scale is the activity level
associated with point C. However, it is closer to the socially optimal scale
than is the scale associated with point A, and for this reason represents a
desirable scale change caused by the imposition of strict liability.
Consider, for example, the keeping of wild animals. In most cases,
keeping a lion in your backyard imposes a risk on your neighbors that is far
in excess of any benefit they may receive from the novelty of observing a
lion from close range. The law imposes strict liability in order to
discourage the activity, even if you have surrounded the lion with an
impenetrable steel cage. However, if you are operating a zoo, some courts
have held that the negligence rule applies. 22 The reason is that the public
benefits offered by the zoo are substantial. The ratio of externalized risk to
externalized benefit is much lower in the case of the zoo than in the case of
the individual who keeps a lion in his backyard.
A no-duty rule would relieve the actor of a duty to take care, which
subsidizes his activity. To see the subsidization effect, compare the no-duty
case to that of the negligence rule. Recall that under the negligence rule,
the actor faces no costs from liability because he takes care. However, even
in the case of the negligence rule the actor bears the cost of taking care.
The no-duty rule subsidizes the actor by relieving him of the cost of taking
care. This is equivalent to shifting the actor's private marginal cost
schedule down, resulting in a new scale choice of F.
Could a no-duty rule be socially desirable? Consider the case in which
the external benefits associated with the actor's activity are large
(represented in the figure by MSB (high externality)), and the external costs
are relatively modest (represented by the schedule labeled MSC (low
externality)). The socially optimal scale of the activity is that associated
with point G. Subsidizing the actor by relieving him of a duty to take care
shifts his private marginal cost schedule down, resulting in scale choice F.
Since the scale associated with F is close to the scale associated with G, the

22. See, e.g., Guzzi v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 182 N.Y.S. 257 (App. Div. 1920), affd,
135 N.E. 897 (N.Y. 1922); City of Denver v. Kennedy, 476 P.2d 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970),
after remand, 506 P.2d 764 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
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subsidy results in an optimal shift in the actor's preferred scale of activity.
In other words, the no-duty rule is socially desirable in this case.
What if the external costs are so large that the marginal social benefit
schedule, representing the sum of private and external costs, moves so high
upward that it no longer crosses the marginal social benefit schedule (see
MSC (very high externality) in Figure 1)? This is the case in which costs
are so high relative to benefits that the optimal scale of the activity is zero.
In this case, a property rule rather than a liability rule is desirable. 23 A
property rule prohibits the actor's activity altogether rather than simply
internalizing the costs it generates. 24 An example of this last scenario is
reckless conduct. Recklessly endangering the lives of others is a tort and
also a violation of the criminal law in most states. The law aims to go
beyond internalizing costs in the case of reckless conduct. The law aims to
prohibit it.
Note that this theory suggests that negligence is appropriate when and
only when there is a rough equality between externalized cost and
externalized benefit. If there is no such equality, as in point E, there is no
economic or utilitarian basis for choosing the negligence rule instead of
strict liability.
In addition to the subsidization function illustrated in Figure 1 (see point
F), no-duty rules also serve as complements to property rules. Thus, when
conduct by an injurer against a victim is prohibited by a property rule, we
will see that corresponding conduct by the victim against the injurer is often
governed by a no-duty rule.
The foregoing functions of no-duty rules correct market failures or
missing markets. Another function of no-duty rules is to simply permit
markets to optimally regulate activity levels. In some instances, we will see
below, the imposition of a duty of care (negligence liability) may distort the
activity level choice away from the socially optimal level. One setting in
which this occurs is where the actors can observe external costs and benefits
and take them into account in contracting decisions. When informed actors
are aware of potential external costs, and can effectively contract over both
the scale of activity and the level of care, imposing liability may distort
activity levels by preventing parties from contracting over the care level.
Conversely, there are settings where, because of informational asymmetry,
imposing negligence liability for a certain type of loss distorts the market.
The three functions of no-duty rules are: (1) to provide subsidization; (2)
to serve as complements to property rules; and (3) to permit the market to
regulate activity levels without distortions created by liability. The first and
third functions, as will be clear shortly, are quite similar. The foregoing
23. On property rules and liability rules, see generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
6; Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 Rev. of L. & Econ.

137 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol2/iss2/artl; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
713 (1996).
24. Calabresi & Melarned, supra note 6, at 1092.
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analysis is a skeletal discussion of the functions of duty rules and strict
liability. In the next section I will consider cases and describe how they fit
within the skeletal structure developed to this point.
II. APPLICATIONS

A. Complements to PropertyRules: Duties to Trespassersand to the
Reckless
1. Trespasses to Property
Some "no-duty" rules in tort law are simply complements to property
rules. The rule that a landowner owes no duty of
care to a trespasser is an
25
example of such a complementary property rule.
Trespass law is a property rule in the sense that it permits the landowner
to enjoin the trespasser and to seek damages. The power to enjoin forces
the would-be trespasser to bargain for access to the landowner's property.
The injunction power protects the subjective valuation of the landowner,
because if the trespasser could invade the landowner's property and be
required to do no more than pay compensatory damages, the subjective
portion of the landowner's valuation would not be protected by the law.
The rules regarding duties of landowners to trespassers are surprisingly
complicated. The landowner owes no duty to take care to avoid an injury to
the trespasser. Thus, if the landowner has a patch of quicksand on his
property, he does not have a duty to warn the trespasser to avoid the
quicksand. However, the landowner is not permitted to intentionally injure
the trespasser, or to lay traps for him.2 6 Moreover, if the landowner
attempts to remove the trespasser, he must use force that is reasonable in
light of the circumstances. 2 7 Thus, the no-duty rule regarding trespassers is
coupled under the law with a reasonable force rule governing the
landowner's intentional conduct toward the trespasser.
The law on trespass, then, has the following general form. A property
rule governs trespass. The property rule allows the landowner to enjoin and
to seek damages for invasions. As a complement to that property rule, there
is a no-duty-of-care rule that applies to the landowner. The propertycomplement rule also contains a reasonable-force requirement that bars
certain intentional torts committed by the landowner against the trespasser.

25. See, e.g., Turbeville v. Mobile Light & R. Co., 127 So. 519 (Ala. 1930); Buch v.
Amory Mfg. Co. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898); Robert Addie & Sons (Colleries), Ltd. v.
Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.); William L. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts 357 (4th ed. 1971).
26. E.g., Robert Addie & Sons, [1929] A.C. at 367.
27. See M'Ilvoy v. Cockran, 9 Ky. 271 (1820); Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep.
911 (C.P.).
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Continuing with the effort to generalize the law on trespass, we may say
that it consists of a property rule, which enjoins potential trespassers and
imposes strict liability against trespassers, and a property-complement rule,
which relieves landowners of the duty of care and imposes liability for
unreasonable uses of force by the landowner.
The purpose of the property-complement rule is easy to see. It relieves
the landowner of a duty of care to the trespasser in order to protect the
landowner's subjective valuation of his property. In other words, the noduty-toward-trespassers rule serves the same function as the injunction right
in trespass law. If landowners owed a duty of care to trespassers, they
would have to invest resources into preventing harm to trespassers. Since
trespassers can arrive from many different directions-they don't generally
choose the front gate as the point at which to invade-a duty to prevent
harm could impose enormous costs on the landowner. Since the required
investments would be made to benefit the trespasser, a duty of care toward
trespassers would effectively transfer part of the landowner's valuation of
his property to the trespasser. This obviously contradicts the function of the
property rule. If trespassers desire protection against defective conditions
or other lapses in care on the landowner's property, they should bargain for
it. The property-complement rule effectively forces potential trespassers to
bargain for the protection that a duty of care would give them.
The reasonable-force rule can be viewed as an implication of a more
basic property rule, the one prohibiting intentional batteries. The fact that a
trespasser winds up on your property does not give you the right to shoot
him with a rifle or run him through with a spear. On the other hand, some
force used to remove the trespasser is permitted or privileged, again as a
complement to the underlying property rule.
As an illustration of the function of the no-duty rule, consider Gladon v.
GreaterCleveland Regional Transit Authority.28 The plaintiff, Gladon, had
been beaten up by two men while waiting for a train and had been left on
the tracks with his leg draped over one of the rails. An approaching train
failed to break in time, causing severe injuries. Although he did not
intentionally walk onto the tracks, he got there through no fault of the
railroad. The court classified him as a trespasser and held that the railroad
owed no duty to discover and avoid injuring him.
The plaintiff in Gladon offered a sympathetic case for compensation.
However, a rule requiring the railroad to discover and avoid injury to a
trespasser on the rails would impose an enormous burden on the railroad.
The duty would apply not only to unfortunate victims who slip or who are
thrown onto the tracks, but also to riskseekers who choose to run along the
tracks for the fun of it. Perhaps it is enough to say that that is no way to run
a railroad. If it were feasible at all to continue to offer rail service under a
duty to look out for trespassers on the rails, it would surely become an
exorbitantly expensive service. With a small client base-the result of cost
28. 662 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio 1996).
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increases passed on to customers-and substantial fixed costs, rail service
would generally fail as a business or government service.
Admittedly, the no-duty-to-trespassers rule seems harsh in many
applications. For example, in Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co.,2 9 the
court denied compensation to an eight-year-old boy who had followed his
brother into a mill to learn his brother's work. The boy's hand was crushed
in a machine as his brother tried to teach him how to use it. The court held
that the boy was a trespasser and therefore not entitled to a warning about
the dangers of the machines, which would have been obvious to an adult.
The result seems harsh given that the mill overseer knew of the boy's
presence and presumably could have put him out rather than let him
30
continue to expose himself to great risk.
Harsh-seeming cases involving the no-duty rule are the ones most likely
to be litigated. They are not necessarily representative of the rule's
operation in general. The function of the rule is better assessed in light of
the case of an intentional trespasser who walks onto train tracks or into a
manufacturing plant. In these cases, property rules appear to be necessary
parts of the organization of productive activities. Railroads must be able to
exclude others from their tracks and to use their tracks with the assumption
of exclusive possession. Manufacturers must be able to exclude pedestrians
from their plants. The no-duty-to-trespassers rule is simply a component of
the property rules that facilitate productive efforts.
2. Trespasses to the Person
If the no-duty-to-trespassers rule is simply a part of the structure of
property rules, an analogous rule must exist in the case of trespasses to the
person. Property rule protection-that is, the power to enjoin and to hold
liable-exists for real property and for personal integrity, too.
Consider false imprisonment. The wrongful detainor's position is similar
to that of a trespasser on real property. I am assuming, of course, that the
detention is without justification. In other words, this example assumes that
the detainor cannot justify his decision to imprison the victim by some
claim that he needed to confine the victim in order to investigate the loss of
personal property or to prevent an intentional tort at the hands of the
3
detainee. 1
To make the comparison reasonably close, assume the detainor has not
yet confined the victim. The detainor is approaching the victim, with an
apparent aim to confine him. Suppose the potential victim has been
infected by some highly communicable disease-the SARS virus or

29. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897).

30. The mill overseer ordered the boy to leave after he had assisted the other employees,
in full view of the overseer, for roughly a day and a half. The boy did not leave and was

injured soon after being ordered to leave.
31. See, e.g., Coblyn v. Kennedy's Inc., 268 N.E.2d 860 (Mass. 1971); Kirby v. Foster,
22A. 1111 (R.I. 1891).
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Ebola-that would be communicated to the detainor if the detainor carries
out his plan. The theory of this essay implies that the potential victim has
no duty to warn the detainor of the risk.
One could justify this answer in narrow economic terms by saying that
"moral hazard" would be introduced by a rule imposing a duty on the
potential victim to warn a kidnapper of the risk of contracting a disease.
The same could be said of a rule that requires trains to look out for
unauthorized individuals on their tracks-that it creates the moral hazard of
encouraging risk seekers to stroll on train tracks. But the moral hazard
argument presupposes a noncommittal view of the underlying property
rights. If the underlying property rights are fixed, as they are by the law,
then any duty to warn a trespasser necessarily implies a weakening of those
rights, and a corresponding transfer of value. Property rules are designed
precisely to prohibit such a transfer of value.
Once the detainor has apprehended or captured his victim, the victim
earns the right to use force to prevent the capture or to escape. The use of
force is privileged to the extent that it is reasonable in light of
circumstances.
Deadly force may be privileged in some instances.
Questions of care in the course of defending oneself from a kidnapping are
largely resolved by the reasonable force requirement of the law.
Suppose, however, that the potential victim uses reasonable force against
the detainor, and an injury results because of some danger that the potential
victim failed to observe. Suppose, to take a concrete example, the victim
pushes the detainor in order to escape his grasp, and the detainor falls on a
bed of nails and is severely injured. If the victim had taken a second more
to observe his surroundings, he would have noticed the bed of nails, and
may have chosen to push the detainor in a different direction.
Would the detainor, in this scenario, have an action for negligence in
self-defense? Such an action would assume that the potential victim had a
duty to avoid carelessly injuring the attacker in addition to the requirement
of reasonable force. Although the institution of insurance has given rise to
claims of negligent self-defense, such a claim would be inconsistent with
the underlying theory of property-rule protection.
3. Reckless Conduct
The preceding property-complement rule examples have dealt with
events that can be described as "takings" in some sense. A trespass to real
or to personal property is a taking in the sense that the taker expropriates
something of value, exclusive possession, from the victim in a circumstance
in which the taker could have bargained for consent. The same general
description applies to trespasses to the person, such as wrongful
imprisonment or battery. Property rules apply in these circumstances
because they force potential invaders to seek consent from the property
owner. Property rules apply in these circumstances, as Guido Calabresi and
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A. Douglas Melamed demonstrated, 32 precisely because transaction costs
are low.
There is another set of circumstances in which property rules should
apply-when the actor's conduct is socially undesirable no matter the scale.
In other words, the socially desirable scale of the activity is zero. This is
the case in which the marginal social cost of the actor's activity is so high
that it is always greater than its marginal social benefit (see Figure 1, MSC
(very high externality)). The standard example is reckless conduct: for
example, driving against the direction of traffic, or playing with a loaded
gun in a crowded area.
As a general rule, contributory negligence is not permitted as a defense to
a claim of recklessness. 33 Translating this rule to the language of duty, this
is equivalent to saying that the victim of reckless conduct owes no duty of
care toward the reckless actor. The duty imposed on Xto take care to avoid
injury to Y is suspended when X is a potential victim and Y is acting
recklessly. To take a concrete example, suppose X is carelessly looking at a
highway billboard rather than the road while driving. Y is recklessly
driving at a high speed against the highway traffic direction. If Y smashes
into X, Y will be barred from asserting contributory negligence against X
even though X might have avoided the injury if he were not staring at the
billboard.
The rule relieving the victim of reckless conduct of the duty of care
relative to the injurer is a property-complement rule, which serves
essentially the same function as the previous property-complement rules
examined. It prevents the subsidization of conduct to which a property-rule
prohibition applies.
B. Subsidization Through Law and Related Goals
1. Rescue Attempts
Rescue appears to have a special status in tort law. The law attempts to
encourage or subsidize rescue efforts. At the same time, the law makes a
special effort to avoid imposing penalties on individuals who refuse to
rescue. The approaches appear contradictory at first glance, but can be
reconciled within the framework of this essay.
Let us start with the law governing rescue attempts. Courts have held
that someone who attempts a rescue cannot be held guilty of contributory
negligence unless he has acted in a rash or reckless manner. 34 In other
words, the duty of care that one owes oneself, and that courts regularly
enforce, is suspended in the case of rescue. The rescuer owes no duty to
take reasonable care to avoid injuring himself.
32. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 6.
33. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 426.
34. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
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In Eckert v. Long Island Railroad Co.,35 the plaintiffs decedent saw a
child standing on a train track as a train approached, running in reverse.
The decedent ran to the track and threw the child clear of it but was struck
by the oncoming train. There was evidence of negligence on the part of the
railroad.
The railroad argued in defense that the decedent was
contributorily negligent because he had voluntarily put himself in the way
of the train. The court held that the plaintiffs decedent would not be
deemed contibutorily negligent unless his conduct was "such as to be
36
regarded either rash or reckless."
A similar question arose in Wagner v. InternationalRailway Co. 3 7 The
plaintiff and his cousin boarded a train and were unable to move away from
the open doors because of the crowd. The cousin was thrown overboard as
the train crossed a bridge. The plaintiff was allowed to walk along the
bridge, to look for his cousin's body. He lost his footing and fell to the
ground below, suffering injuries. The defendant railroad argued that it
should not be held responsible for the injuries to the rescuer because his
intervention, which was not reflexive or impulsive but was preceded by
several minutes in which he could consider the risks and benefits of
attempting to rescue, severed the chain of causation between their initial
negligence and the rescuer's injury.
Judge Benjamin Cardozo, citing
Eckert, held that the rescuer's intervention should be considered a natural
38
and foreseeable result, unless his actions were reckless,
In terms of the skeletal theory offered in the previous part, the rule that a
rescuer has no duty of care on his own behalf is consistent with the
subsidization function of no-duty rules (see Figure 1, point F). By relieving
rescuers of the duty to take care for their own safety, courts effectively
subsidize rescue attempts. This is justifiable on the theory that the societal
39
benefits of high-stakes altruism are substantial.
The fact that rescuers hardly ever think about the possibility of receiving
compensation does not clearly undermine this account of the rule relieving
the rescuer of a duty to care for his own safety. All that is necessary for this
theory to fit the reasoning of the cases is that courts recognize that highstakes altruism provides a substantial social benefit relative to other
activities. That recognition alone is sufficient to justify the decision by
courts to relieve rescuers of the duty of self-care, and that recognition is
40
apparent in the reasoning of Eckert.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 506.
37. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
38. Id. at 437-38.
39. Certainly society behaves as if the social benefits of high-stakes altruism are
substantial. See, e.g., Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature 149-50 (1978). Perhaps the
reason we reward altruism so consistently is because some level of reciprocal altruism is
necessary in a well-functioning society.
40. "The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an
effort to preserve it ....Eckert, 43 N.Y. at 506.
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Since the subsidization function of the no-duty rule is so clear in the case
of rescue, this is a good place to consider one other area of the law in which
the no-duty rule's subsidization function is equally clear. The subsidization
function is perhaps most obvious in settings in which aggressive conduct is
permitted or encouraged. The two most obvious examples are violent
sports and courtroom litigation. There is no duty imposed on a football
player to take care to avoid injuring an opponent. 4 1 No duty is imposed on
an attorney to take care to avoid causing unnecessary harm to an adversary
in litigation. 42 The reason is the same in both cases. Aggressive conduct
toward adversaries is considered socially desirable in both settings. A duty
of care toward adversaries would discourage precisely the sort of conduct
that society demands of participants.
2. The Duty to Rescue
Although tort law subsidizes rescue, it avoids imposing a duty to rescue.
Indeed, the general default rule in tort law is that there is no duty to rescue.
How can we reconcile the subsidization provided by the law governing
rescue attempts (e.g., Eckert, Wagner) with the law's refusal to require
rescue?
Before explaining how the no-duty-to-rescue rule (or the "rescue rule")
fits within this framework, I should mention two preliminary matters. First,
the rescue rule has exceptions. One exception imposes a duty on an
individual who starts to rescue a victim and then abandons the effort,
leaving the victim in a position probably worse than if the rescuer had never
attempted to help. 4 3 Another exception imposes a duty to rescue when the
individual has harmed someone in a way that leaves the victim helpless and
in danger of further harm. 44 Another exception is the case in which the
actor's conduct, negligent or not, creates a dangerous condition for the
45
potential victim.
The second preliminary matter is that the rescue rule should be judged in
terms of its impact in obvious and common circumstances rather than the
fact patterns that appear in the cases. The reported cases involving the rule
tend to be the most difficult ones on which to justify it. That is not a
coincidence. The cases that are most likely to be litigated, and reported in
casebooks, are those involving the most troubling applications of the rule.
46
For example, Buch is a troubling outcome, viewing it as a rescue case.
The mill overseer in Buch could have acted more forcefully to bar the eightyear-old victim from returning to the mill where his hand was later crushed.
41. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979); Nabozny v.
Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
42. 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 488 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Black v.
N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 79 N.E. 797 (Mass. 1907).
44. See, e.g., Summers v. Dominguez, 84 P.2d 237 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
45. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 247 (S.C. 1937).
46. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898).
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The same can be said of Yania v. Bigan,47 where the defendant, Bigan, had
taunted Yania to jump into the water in which he drowned. Cases such as
Buch and Yania are litigated precisely 48because they are troubling
applications of generally well-accepted rules.
The most obvious setting in which the rescue rule operates is one in
which the potential rescuer does nothing to create the danger in which the
victim finds himself. Suppose, for example, the potential rescuer goes to
the beach to read a book. A stranger calls for help from the water. The
potential rescuer watches as the stranger drowns. I will label this "the
typical rescue scenario."
The function of the rescue rule in the typical rescue scenario can be
understood in terms of the theory set out earlier. Ordinarily, a duty to take
care is imposed when there is some reciprocal exchange between risk and
benefit, or a reciprocal exchange of risks (see Figure 1, point B). However,
in the typical rescue scenario, there is no reciprocal exchange of risks, or
between risk and benefit. The potential rescuer's activity does not
externalize any extraordinary risk to the potential victim. To hold the
potential rescuer liable for the victim's drowning would be the same, in
terms of activity level effects, as holding him liable for some random
accident involving people with whom he has no connection.
Sure, the potential rescuer could have prevented the harm to the victim.
But under the theory of tort liability offered here, a necessary condition for
the imposition of a duty of care is that there be a reciprocal exchange
between costs externalized by both the victim's and the actor's activity or
between the costs and benefits of the actor's activity. 49 When there is no
such reciprocal exchange because there is no substantial risk externalized
by the actor's activity, the duty of care acts as a tax on the actor's activity.
Tort law, however, avoids taxing activities in the absence of an imbalance
between externalized costs and benefits or a nonreciprocal exchange of risk.
It follows that a duty to rescue would be an unjustifiable tax on the potential
rescuer's activity.
Consider, for example, Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School District,50 where
the plaintiff pedestrian was injured by a student driving recklessly out of the
high school parking lot. The plaintiff sued the school district on the theory
that it had a duty to supervise the student. The school district officials,
however, did not know, nor had reason to know, of the student's
recklessness. The court held that the school district had no duty to

47. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
48. Another famous troubling application of the rescue rule is Osterlindv. Hill, 160 N.E.

301 (Mass. 1928), in which the defendant rented a canoe to an intoxicated victim, then sat on
the dock, equipped with a boat and rope, and watched the victim drown.

49. If the actor's activity imposes a much greater external cost than external benefit, a
duty of care is socially desirable too. But in that case, strict liability is also desirable in order
to suppress the activity. For this reason, I describe the reciprocal exchange case as a
necessary or minimum condition for the imposition of a duty of care.
50. 19 Cal. 4th 925 (1998).
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supervise the student under these circumstances. Although framed as a
standard negligence claim, it is essentially a rescue case. The outcome is
justifiable under the theory of this paper, because the school district, by
enrolling the student, did not introduce a risk to pedestrians that was any
greater than the background risk that the state had already introduced by
licensing young drivers.
If this theory explains the absence of a duty to rescue in the typical rescue
scenario, it should also explain the exceptions. Consider the exception that
applies when the potential rescuer takes the victim away from other
potential rescuers and then fails to carry through with reasonable care. For
example, suppose the potential rescuer sequesters the victim of an illness or
of a beating, so that others cannot provide help, and simply allows the
victim to suffer, 5 1 perhaps in a misguided effort to help. The potential
rescuer's conduct in this case dramatically increases the risk of harm to the
victim-at least in comparison to doing nothing. This changes the
exchange between externalized risk and benefit in a manner that justifies
the imposition of a duty of care.
3. Duties toward Licensees and Invitees
In addition to the rule that says that a landowner owes no duty of care to
a trespasser, the law traditionally has distinguished the duties owed to a
licensee and to an invitee. The landowner owes a general duty of care to
the invitee. To the licensee, the landowner has a duty to inform or correct
defective conditions in the property of which the landowner is aware.
However, the landowner has no duty, with respect to the licensee, to
investigate and discover defective conditions. In brief, the landowner's
duties to the invitee and licensee are the same except that the landowner
owes to the invitee, and not to the licensee, a duty to make a reasonable
inspection for potential hazards.
The function of this distinction is the same as the previous ones
considered: to optimally regulate activity levels. Optimal regulation of
activity levels generally means allowing markets or quasi-markets to
function without distortions of liability. On the other hand, where
substantial imbalances in externalized risks and benefits exist, optimal
regulation of activity levels requires the imposition of strict liability, or, in
other cases, subsidization through exemption from liability (no-duty rule).
The key difference between the invitee and the licensee is that the
licensee, under the law, assumes the risk of latent defects on the property of
which the landowner is unaware. The invitee does not assume the risk. We
could also view this difference as a subsidy created by the law. The law
appears to subsidize the landowner to some extent in his relationship with
the licensee. Alternatively, or equivalently, we could view the law as
taxing the landowner in his relationship with the invitee by imposing strict

51. See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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liability for latent defects. Either view could be defended in the context of
this model. Does the law make sense in terms of the model of this paper?
First, consider the invitee. The invitee visits for a business reason. For
example, an invitee might be the repairman who visits the landowner's
house in order to repair the central air conditioning system. To do so, he
may have to climb up to the attic, where defective conditions might exist
that would ordinarily not come to the attention of the owner. Since the
invitee is likely to be unaware of any particular conditions on the
landowner's property, and typically does not have the freedom to choose
where he will go on the property, there is no hypothetical contract basis for
treating him as one who has assumed the risk of latent defects. Moreover,
in most such relationships it is assumed that all of the costs and benefits are
recognized in the contract. There are no external costs and benefits, or if
so, they are trivial. There is no reason in this setting to adopt a subsidy of
any sort for either party. The general negligence test should apply, as it
does.
Even though the general negligence test applies to the invitee case, it
operates much like a rule holding the landowner strictly liable for latent
defects. The reason for this is that the burden of preventing latent defects
from occurring is probably too high to be met. Preventing latent defects
from occurring requires nondurable precaution-that is, precaution that
involves almost continual monitoring and investment. As Mark Grady has
argued, rules that impose a duty to take nondurable precaution often operate
52
in effect like strict liability.

To the extent that the duty, owed to the invitee, to prevent latent defects
from occurring acts like strict liability, it is still defensible within the
context of this model. The reason is that the invitee does not have enough
information to assume the risk with respect to such defects. A rule
relieving the landowner of liability for such defects would lead to
overexposure to or "overconsumption" of risk on the part of the invitee.
This is analogous to the case of the consumer who, in the absence of strict
products liability, consumes a risky product without knowing its
characteristics. 5 3 Imposing liability for latent defects effectively controls
the activity level chosen jointly by the landowner and invitee, by
internalizing the cost of latent defects to the landowner.
Next, consider the licensee. The licensee is typically a social guest.
Unlike the invitee, the social guest often knows something about the
condition of the landowner's property, and, if not, at least intends to assume
a wide privilege to enjoy the property when he arrives to it. The licensee
does not have to climb up to the landowner's attic, and if he does so, it is
usually without any compulsion.
The licensee often has enough

52. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev.

887, 909-12 (1994).
53. See James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 64

(1970).
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information, or makes voluntary decisions as if he has enough information,
to make an informed decision to confront the risk of a defective condition in
the property. There is a hypothetical contract basis for treating him as one
who has assumed the risk. Given this, the licensee does not overconsume
risk in his relationship with the landowner, and therefore there is no basis
for internalizing the cost of latent defects to the landowner. This is a
sufficient justification for the different duty rules applied in the licensee and
invitee settings.
However, in addition to the risk-externalization justification just offered,
there is a benefit-externalization argument that also justifies the different
rules applied to invitees and licensees. In most licensee-landowner
relationships there is an imbalanced exchange between costs and benefits.
The licensee typically enjoys the benefits-he has come to the landowner's
property for that reason, perhaps, for example, to swim in the landowner's
pool-and the benefits are funded by the landowner. The law can bring
about a closer equality between the exchange of costs and benefits
(externalized or not mediated through the price system) by providing a
subsidy to the landowner, which it does in the form of the rule relieving the
landowner of a duty to inspect for defective conditions.
These arguments suggest that as a default rule, the traditional distinction
between invitees and licensees can be justified in terms of its impact on
activity level decisions. The assumption of risk component is in accord
with typical conditions and allows the quasi-market in "social exchange" to
function without being distorted by the liability rule. The narrow no-duty
rule with respect to licensees is justifiable in light of the licensee's
knowledge of risk and the exchange between uncompensated benefits and
costs among the parties.
This analysis points to key factors that should determine the distinction
between invitees and licensees. First, the victim should have exercised a
free choice about where to go on the landowner's property. The exercise of
a voluntary decision, rather than one compelled by a prior contractual
commitment made in the dark as to the conditions of the property, justifies
the law's decision to treat the victim as having assumed the risk. Second,
there should be an observable uncompensated exchange in which the
licensee is the net beneficiary.
The law does not appear to be uniform even among states that apply the
traditional rule because of conflicts between these underlying factors. In
many cases, the licensee is the one who provides the benefit to the
landowner, while at the same time the licensee exercises a free choice over
where he will go on the property.
For example, in Lemon v. Busey, 54 the plaintiff grandmother, a part-time
church employee, brought her five-year-old granddaughter to the church
while she worked there. The child wandered off and fell to her death from
the roof of the church. The court held that the plaintiff was a licensee and
54. 461 P.2d 145 (Kan. 1969).
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rejected her claim on the ground that the church had no duty to inspect for
dangerous conditions that might not be apparent to the eyes of a five-yearold. 55 Needless to say, Lemon is a troubling outcome because the
grandmother deserved to be treated as an invitee. The church provided a
benefit beyond the basic contract by permitting the plaintiff to bring her
granddaughter with her, but this concession may have simply been
necessary to get her to work. In other words, the agreement to bring the
granddaughter may have been a part of the employment contract, which
implies that there was no uncompensated benefit given to the plaintiff.
Another set of cases in which courts have shown confusion over the
licensee-invitee distinction includes those in which a social guest comes
over to the landowner's property to help with some project and is injured as
the result of a hidden defective condition. For example, in Burrell v.
Meads,56 the homeowner and a friend were installing a ceiling in the
homeowner's garage. The friend climbed up to the rafters, and after
handing some items to the homeowner, walked across something he thought
was plywood but was not. The friend fell to the garage floor, suffering
severe injuries. The court rejected the traditional categorization and treated
the friend as an invitee.
4. Landlords and Tenants
Traditional common law regarding the landlord's liability holds the
landlord liable for injuries
resulting from defective and dangerous conditions in the premises if the
injury [was] attributable to (1) a hidden danger in the premises of which
the landlord but not the tenant is aware, (2) premises leased for public use,
(3) premises retained under the landlord's control, such as common
stairways, or (4) premises negligently repaired by the landlord. 57
The traditional law can be explained by the framework of this essay.
The explanation for the traditional law regarding the liability of landlords
begins with the observation that all observable costs and benefits will
typically be taken into account in the contracting stage between the parties.
If the general state of the property is obvious to the tenants, the market will
result in a price that compensates for the risk accepted by the tenant,
relative to some safer alternative. Under this assumption, there would be no
substantial externalized costs or benefits-because all costs and benefits
will be taken into account in setting the terms of the contract. This implies
that the proper default liability rule is negligence (Figure 1, point B or A). 58

55. Id. at 146.
56. 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991).
57. Richard Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 582 (7th ed. 2000) (citing Sargent v.
Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (N.H. 1973)).
58. Point B in Figure 1 assumes there are insubstantial externalized risks and benefits,
while point A assumes there are no externalized risks or benefits. Either would fit as a
description of this case.
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The default rule of negligence is consistent with the traditional law's
treatment of the landlord's duty to tenants in spaces under the landlord's
control, such as common areas. The law puts a general duty of care on the
landlord, which implies a duty to fix defective conditions when the landlord
is aware of them and the tenant is not, and to make reasonable inspections
for defective conditions. In other words, the tenant is treated as an invitee
in common areas. Of course, this is a default rule. Presumably the tenant
could bargain for a less generous treatment if he preferred a discount on the
rental charge in exchange for waiving any claims for liability in connection
with defective conditions in common areas.
While the traditional law treats the tenant as an invitee in common areas,
it treats the tenant as licensee in the space which he occupies. What
explains the difference? Unlike the traditional invitee-licensee distinction,
there is no general imbalance in uncompensated benefits and costs in the
landlord-tenant relationship. The entire exchange is mediated through the
price system. However, there is a hypothetical contract basis for treating
the tenant as having assumed some risk with respect to the space that the
tenant occupies. The tenant is likely to have as much information or more
than does the landlord as to defective conditions in the area he occupies.
He is in a position to offer a price that reflects his assessment of the risk of
the rental unit he occupies. The tenant is in a position to demand an
upgrade in the conditions of his rental unit in exchange for a higher rental
charge.
On the assumption that the tenant accurately observes the risk level,
treating the tenant as a licensee in the rental unit that he occupies permits
the market to assign different prices to different risk levels. If the risk level
of a unit is in general a function of the likelihood of a defective condition
developing, then the rule relieving the landlord of a duty to inspect for
defective conditions in the tenant's unit permits the landlord and the tenant
to contract over the risk level of the tenant's unit. Consumer/tenants will
offer lower bids for units with higher risk levels.
The sorting of
consumer/tenants according to risk preferences enhances consumer welfare
relative to a rule that discourages sorting.
The common areas that the landlord controls are distinguishable from the
unit occupied by the tenant. In common areas, it is unlikely that the tenant
has as much or more information on the risk level. And even if the tenant is
as well informed as the landlord on the risk level of the common areas, his
incentives are quite different from the case in which he assesses the risk of
his own unit. The level of safety in the common area is a public good, and
this diminishes the extent to which the risk level will be made a part of the
contracting process between the landlord and the tenant. While the tenant
may exit if he finds the risk level too high in the common area, he will have
weak incentives to offer a higher bid in exchange for a reduction in the risk
level.
If tenants were unable to accurately observe the risk level of a rental unit,
this justification for the traditional common law governing landlord liability
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would be invalid. If tenants could not observe or assess risk, allowing the
tenant and landlord to contract over the risk level would result in
overconsumption of risky rental units. A duty rule would be a desirable
mechanism to push the level of consumption of risky rental units to a lower
level.
Consider, for example, the rule regarding premises leased for public use,
which imposes on the landlord a general duty of care. Suppose, for
example, the landlord rents a space to be used for some specific function
attended by people who are unfamiliar with the property. In this case, the
short-term tenants would have no reason to be aware of the risk level of the
unit they temporarily occupy. A rule treating them as licensees would lead
to overconsumption of risk, since the short-term tenants would not have
taken the risk level into account at the contracting stage. The traditional
common law appears to adopt the optimal regulatory response because it
treats the short-term tenants as invitees. In other words, the law recognizes
that a market in which the risk level is priced is unlikely to develop in the
short-term scenario. Consequently, it treats the short-term occupants as
invitees when the property is leased for public use.
5. Duties of Landlords Continued: Obvious Conditions and Crime
Even though landowners have a general duty of care to invitees, they are
not liable to them for injuries resulting from obvious conditions. Suppose,
for example, a building owned by the landowner has such a low entryway
that visitors bump their heads on the doorframe as they enter the building.
Since this is likely to be an obvious condition, something a visitor could
easily see on his way toward the door, the landowner will often escape
liability in these cases. Similarly, the general duty owed by landlords to
tenants in common areas is suspended in the case of obvious conditions.
There are straightforward reasons that a landowner is not held liable for
obvious conditions. The fact that the condition is obvious implies that there
may be no need to employ liability in order to regulate activity level
decisions. Second, the injuries resulting from obvious conditions are
typically due to the negligence of the victim.
Crime is also an obvious condition, especially in urban areas. However,
in Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,59 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that landlords have a duty to take steps
to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts in common areas of the
building. The decision went against the earlier settled rule that a private
person, whether landlord or not, does not have a duty to protect another
60
from a criminal act.
Kline is difficult to square with the framework of this paper, and could be
treated as an unjustifiable deviation from the traditional common law rule.

59. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. Id. at 481.
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However, the decision has survived more than thirty years and is now the
rule in most jurisdictions. Are there conditions under which it might be
seen as consistent with this essay's framework?
I noted earlier that defective conditions in common areas are less likely to
be regulated optimally by the market. The same can be said of safety from
crime in common areas, since it is a public good. Tenants have weak
incentives to bargain for safety. Suppose, for example, there are three
tenants. The cost of hiring a security guard is $1200 per week or $400 per
tenant if the cost is passed on in full. Suppose one tenant is willing to pay
an additional $700 per week for security. If that one tenant knows that the
other two are in favor of additional security and willing to pay the same
amount, that tenant has an incentive to understate his desire for security,
free riding off the others. Conversely, if one tenant knows that the other
two are not willing to pay anything for a guard, he has no incentive to seek
additional security, since his bid will not be sufficient to cover the cost.
The only case in which the one tenant has an incentive to state his
61
preferences honestly is when his vote is pivotal to the decision.
The argument that safety is unlikely to be regulated optimally by the
market implies that landlords should have a duty to take steps to enhance
safety. This is simply a version of the argument for requiring a general duty
of care to tenants in the common areas of the landlord's building. On the
other hand, this argument is undercut by the fact that crime is typically an
obvious condition.
There is one key distinction between crime and other obvious conditions,
such as a low doorframe, that might justify the decision in Kline. Most
obvious conditions in common areas are permanent conditions that are
encountered frequently by the tenant. Crime, in contrast, is observed
infrequently and its rate of occurrence changes over time.
In the case of a low doorframe, the tenant will observe the feature every
day, and perhaps several times a day. Moreover, in the vast majority of
instances, accidents are not serious. Most tenants tall enough to bump their
heads against the doorframe will simply tell themselves to remember to
duck the next time. Obvious conditions in common areas can be described
as high-probability-low-harm events. They happen frequently without
causing much harm in most cases.
However, crime is observed infrequently and is quite harmful when it
occurs. The ability to learn of the risk is limited in this case. 62 Moreover,

61. For a more general statement of this contracting problem, see Keith N. Hylton, A
Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Implicationsfor Labor Law, 74 Tex. L.

Rev.

1742, 1756-63 (1996).
62. Early behavioral experiments by B.F. Skinner suggested that subjects learn the
connection between action and reward (or punishment) through repeated interaction. B.F.
Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (1953). Crime is an example of a punishment that
occurs randomly and infrequently in response to failures to guard against it. Potential
victims are unlikely to accurately estimate, or act as if they had accurately estimated, the
likelihood of crime occurring.

20061

DUTY IN TORT LAW

1525

even if the rate of occurrence is well known, that rate is a changing function
of the opportunities presented. One may assume that the probability of a
tenant being victimized is a function of the overall vulnerability of the
apartment building and the individual vulnerability of the victim. The
overall vulnerability of the apartment building depends on the relative
proportions of old and young tenants, male and female tenants, and so on.
The individual vulnerability is a function of the victim's age, sex, and other
characteristics. Changes in the composition of the apartment building will
therefore affect the individual tenant's likelihood of becoming a crime
victim. But these changes may be unobservable to the tenants. This
implies that the market may fail to bid down the rental charge in a manner
that accurately reflects the likelihood of crime in any given time period and
for any particular tenant. Indeed, for an existing or incumbent tenant, the
frequency of crime may be a latent defect from his or her perspective.
The upshot of this argument is that Kline may, in spite of its apparent
inconsistency with the traditional law, be consistent with the framework of
this essay. Crime is an obvious condition to any tenant, but not obvious in
the same way as a low doorframe in a building entrance. The reasons for
thinking the market will price risk effectively in the case of most obvious
conditions may not hold in the case of crime.
6. Palsgrafand Proximate Cause
As every law student knows, Cardozo's opinion in Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railroad Co. 6 3 defines the duty to take care as an obligation to
foreseeable victims. The underlying economic rationale is the same as that
set out above for the rescue rule. Imposing liability for harms to
unforeseeable victims is equivalent to taxing the defendant's activity. This
is desirable on economic grounds only when the risk externalized by the
defendant's activity is substantially greater than reciprocal risks accepted or
benefits externalized by the actor.
A visual picture of this argument can be described as follows. Imagine
that each actor is surrounded by a probabilistic cloud illustrating the risks
externalized to others when he is engaging in some activity with reasonable
care. When two actors are engaged in an activity such as driving, their
clouds come into contact with each other. The convergence of these clouds
implies a duty to take care. And since the risk clouds put equal impositions
on one another, there is no need to tax one of the actors in order to reduce
his activity level. If an injury occurs from a traffic accident, the negligence
rule should apply, as it does. However, if the risk clouds never come into
contact, then each of the actors is an unforeseeable victim, from the
perspective of the other actor. There is no basis in theory, and no basis in
law under Palsgraffor imposing a duty of care.

63. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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The thought exercise just conducted could just as easily have been put in
terms of proximate cause. When the risk clouds do not come into contact,
the victim of the accident is not foreseeable, and his claim for damages fails
on proximate cause grounds. Palsgrafelevated this basic component of
proximate cause analysis, foreseeability, to the duty prong of the four-part
negligence inquiry.
As this suggests, all analyses that can be framed in terms of the foregoing
thought exercise involving risk clouds-or "activity risk"-can be
considered within the language of proximate cause. That implies that the
rescue rule cases could easily be analyzed as proximate cause cases.
However, it should not be a matter of indifference to courts whether to treat
rescue, and foreseeability cases generally, as issues of duty or proximate
cause. 64 Duty rules are rules of law rather than the primarily fact-bound
inquiry that determines proximate cause. It follows that it makes sense to
treat cases of activity risk under a duty analysis when it is desirable to
minimize uncertainty surrounding the application of the rule. The rescue
rule appears desirable, in this light, because it minimizes the uncertainty
that would be generated by an ill-defined duty to rescue. On the other hand,
the desirability of the Palsgrafrule, relative to the general proximate cause
analysis, is open to question.
The choice between duty and proximate cause analysis involves a tradeoff between uncertainty costs and flexibility. Proximate cause analysis
gives the court maximum flexibility to respond to a set of facts that suggest,
to the court, that liability could be used to enhance incentives for care. The
cost of this flexibility is the uncertainty it creates over the scope of liability
and the potential costs of erroneous impositions of liability. It follows that
a positive theory of the choice of duty doctrine as an alternative to
proximate cause analysis is that it serves to minimize uncertainty costs. In
other words, when a court, in the course of rejecting a claim for liability,
uses the language of duty rather than that of proximate cause, it is implicitly
saying that it considers the costs of uncertainty and erroneous impositions
of liability to be greater than the flexibility and precision advantages of
proximate cause analysis.
7. A Final Application: Hadley v. Baxendale, Economic Loss, and ThirdParty Beneficiaries
The final application of this essay's framework is to the economic loss
problem. Consider a contract between X and Y to do something that affects
Z. For example, suppose, as in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,65
the contract is between a ship owner, X, and a dry dock, Y, to repair a ship
that is under contract to be leased to Z. The dry dock negligently damages
the ship, causing a substantial loss to the owner X and to Z.

64. See Hylton, supra note 12.

65. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
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Hadley v. Baxendale66 provides the rule preventing X from recovering for
the loss of revenue from his contract with Z, unless the prospect of that loss
was brought clearly to the attention of Y In X's action against Y, the court
will disallow recovery for the loss of the revenue from the contract with Z
on the ground that it is not a foreseeable component of damages.
Similarly, in Z's tort action against Y, the court will deny any recovery
whatsoever on the ground that Y is not under a duty of care to protect the
economic returns of Z. That is the message of Robins Dry Dock. It is a
variation of the rule of Hadley. The theory that explains Hadley also
explains Robins Dry Dock. The difference between the two cases is that the
economic loss component is just a portion of the plaintiffs claim in the
Hadley-type setting, while it is the whole of the plaintiffs claim in the
Robins Dry Dock case.
The general rule (or rules) of Hadley and Robins Dry Dock can be
defended on the ground that courts should relieve actors of a duty of care in
instances when such a duty will distort market outcomes. Hadley is easily
explained in view of the adverse selection problem. 67 Holding Y liable for
the economic loss to X implies that Y will have to set a price that covers the
mean economic loss. But that means contracting parties similar to X whose
losses are relatively low will find the contract unattractive, which increases
the mean economic loss among the contracting parties who appear similar
to X, forcing another revision in the contract price, and so on. The adverse
selection problem that justifies the rule of Hadley also justifies the
economic loss rule.
It should be clear that the adverse selection theory also justifies the
outcome in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 6 8 The defendant, a
waterworks company, agreed to supply water to the city of Rensselaer,
which would be used for sewer flushing, for service to public buildings and
fire hydrants, and for other public purposes. The plaintiff's warehouse
burned down after the waterworks company, having received notice of the
fire, failed to supply sufficient water to extinguish the fire. Cardozo's
opinion for the court held that the defendant did not have a duty to an entity
that was not formally a party to the water supply contract.
Cardozo's broad proposition in Moch is better understood in connection
with the facts of the case. The waterworks company charged the city
$42.50 a year for each hydrant. If the company were held liable to city
residents for the losses caused by fires, the fire-hydrant charge would have
had to be set quite a bit higher, especially if the surrounding property
included mansions or expensive commercial property.
Moreover, the
adverse selection process would immediately kick into gear: the higher the
66. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep 145 (Exch.).
67. See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and
Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 284 (1991).
68. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
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fire-hydrant charge, the higher the taxes necessary to cover the charges, and
the less likely low-value properties would be capable of supporting the
taxes.
The general proposition of Moch appears to be that if A is in a contract to
supply services to B which in turn benefit C, A has no duty to take care to
avoid a loss to C. However, this is probably too broadly stated. The
Second Restatement's Section 324A, titled "liability to third person for
negligent performance of undertaking," appears to contradict it. 69 The
proposition of Moch should be understood to apply to the case in which C
involves a large, difficult-to-define class of potential claimants, a setting in
70
which the adverse selection problem is likely to arise.
CONCLUSION

A sense of skepticism toward the concept of duty pervades
consequentialist analyses of tort law from Holmes to Posner. The purpose
of this essay is show that duty, both as an abstract concept and as a set of
detailed rules for channeling tort liability, is easily reconcilable with
utilitarian or economic approaches to tort doctrine. Indeed, economic
analysis provides perhaps the most thorough and consistent set of
explanations for duty doctrine. Duty doctrine appears to serve essentially
three economic functions: subsidizing activities that have substantial
external benefits, supporting or complementing property rules (in the
Calabresi-Melamed sense), and permitting the market to regulate activity
levels without distortions created by liability.

69. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A provides,
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person
or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm
is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1964).
70. For an interesting duty case raising similar market-allocation issues, see Great
Central Insurance Co. v. Insurance Services Office, Inc., 74 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 1996). In
Great CentralInsurance,then-Chief Judge Posner wrote the following:
If a person injures another. .. through culpable conduct such as negligence, why
should not the innocent victim be able to shift his loss to the culpable injurer?
There is no altogether satisfactory answer to this question, but it is obvious that the
law recoils from the full implications of it.... [C]onsiderations of policy ...have
persuaded the courts of all states to place limits on the scope of tort liability
through the concept of duty. The same considerations are in play here. .... To
subject [the defendant] to unlimited liability for the consequence of... mistakes
might be to jeopardize [the defendant's] existence or make [him] unduly timid
about proposing less than astronomical rates ....
Id. at 785.

